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An Exploratory Analysis of Defense/Space Companies ,& 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
I n  a small way, t h i s  study attempts t o  respond t o  the recent challenge 
of Professor George S t ig le r  t o  h i s  fellow economists: 
the s t a t e  has managed t o  hold the attention of scholars f o r  over two centuries 
without arousing t h e i r  curiosity.,,Why have not the  e f fec ts  of the regulatory 
bodies on prices and ra tes  been ascertained?.. Why has not the degree of 
success of governments i n  bringing together private and soc ia l  costs been 
"The economic role  of 
estimated? 12. 
I n  good measure, some of Professor S t ig le r ' s  questions have not been 
answered because of lack of available, usable data. 
pxploratory e f f o r t  a t  examining the impact of the role  of the s t a t e  i n  i t s  
relationships wi th  the private economy. 
s t a t i s t i c a l  data and then go on to  consider the questions of public policy 
t h a t  can be dea l t  with. J 
This, then, iscan 1- 
We start with a small sample of 
. 
It has become fashionable i n  recent years t o  castigate once again 
"munitions lobbyists" and a "military-industrial complex" and t o  bemoan their  
influence on the c iv i l ian  economy. 
has been devoted t o  the impact of the impact o f  the close governmental 
re la t ionship on the industries d i rec t ly  involved. 
paper t o  Illuminate some aspects of the la t ter  relationship. 
In contrast, l i t t l e  thought or  analysis 
It is the purpose of t h i s  
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\Table 1 shows the extent t o  which the 35 companies receiving the largest  
amounts of orders from the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration a re  dependent on such governmental contracts. 
some of the firms, par t icular ly  the e l ec t r i ca l  equipment and autolhobile firms, 
receive large absolute amounts of government contracts, but proportionately 
s t i l l  devote the bulk of the e f for t s  t o  serving consumer and indus t r ia l  markets 
i n  the private economy. 
notably those i n  the aerospace industry, are  primarily suppliers of goods and 
services t o  the Federal Government. 
Clearly, 
In contrast, other--more specialized--companies, 
For purpose of further analysis, l e t  us t a k e , s i x  of the aerospace com- 
panies l i s t e d  i n  Table 1 for  which, by the rough estimates shown there,  
military/space work accounts f o r  one-half o r  more of t h e i r  t o t a l  sales.  
of these companies a re  i n  the 75-100s category of dependence (Lockheed, 
McDonnell, and North American), and three i n  the  50-75s group (Being,  Douglas, 
and United Aircraft) .  
Three 
The next section of t h i s  a r t i c l e  compares t h i s  sample 
of companies with a group of s i x  firms of roughly equal s ize  which ca te r  
primarily t o  the private economy-American Can, Internat ional  Harvester, Johns- 
Manville, National Dairy Products, National Steel ,  and Union Carbide. 
/- 
This 
second set of companies was arrived a t  by select ing the companies i n  the FORTUNE 
l i s t  of the 500 manufacturing companies with the highest sales  volumes which 
were adjacent t o  the s i x  defense/space firms f o r  the same period covered i n  
table  1. 
$7.5 billion f o r  the government-oriented firms and $7.6 b i l l i on  fo r  the other 
(see Table 2). 
Both groups accounted for approximately equal sales  volumes in 1962-- 
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Importance of Defense-Space Orders t o  35 Major Companies 
Fiscal  Year 1962 
(1) (2) (3 )  
Defense Ratio of 
And NASA Company Orders t o  
Contracts %lesa Total Sales 
Company (millions) lmtl l ions)  (I.)/( 2) 
75-100$ 
Republic Aviation Corp. $ 339.7. $429?$,.g!4 $100. o+$ 
McDonnell Aircraf t  379 4 390 7 97-11 
Grumman Aircraft  Engineering Corp. 328.2 357.1 91.91 
LIGdued Aircraf t  corp. 1,424.5 1,753.1 81.27 
AVCO Corp. 324.7 414.3 78.37 
North American Aviation, Inc. 1,231.6 1,633.7 75 39 
Hughes Aircraf t  Corp. 243.4 b C 
,50-74$ 
Collins Radio Co. 153.8 207.8 
Thiokol Chemical Corp. 179.1 255.8 
Raytheon Co. 406.6 580 7 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 185.0 267.3 
Martin Marietta Corp. 804.5 1,195.3 
Boeing Co. 1,148.4 1,768.5 
General Dyanmics Corp. 1,224.5 1,898.4 
Curtiss-Wright Corp. 144.6 228.7 
United Aircraf t  Corp. 696.8 1,162.1 
Douglas-Aircraft Company, Inc. 434,O 749 9 
25-4974 
American Machine & Foundry eo. 
General Tire & Rubber Co. 
Northrop Corp. 
Hercules Powder Co. 
Iperry Rand Corp. 
Bendix Corp, 
F M C Corp. 
Pan American World Airways, Inc. 
0-2446 
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. 
General Electr ic  Co. 
Radio Corporation of America 
Westinghouse Electr ic  Corp. 
International Business Machines Corp. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Corp 
Ford Motor Co. 
General Motors Corp. 
Standard O i l  Co. (New Jersey) 
187.3 
432.5 
153.8 
181.6 
467.8 
305.3 
160.4 
146.7 
245.8 
998.9 
359.8 
249.4 
168.1 
478.5 
269.1 
180.1 
450.4 
415.4 
959.8 
347.5 
454.8 
1,182.6 
788.1 
506.5 
503.9 
995.5 
4,792 7 
1,742.7 
1,954.5 
1,925 2 
11,742.4 
8,089.6 
14,640.2 
9,537.3 
74.01 
70.02 
70.02 
69.21 
67.31 
64.94 
64.50 
63.23 
59 9 96 
%,57 87 
45.09 
45.06 
44.25 
39.93 
39.56 
38 74 
3 1  67 
29.11 
24.69 
20.84 
20.65 
12.76 
8.73 
4.07 
3.33 
3.08 
1.89 
a. 
b. Not available. 
C. 
N e t  sales  f o r  f i s c a l  year ending during 1962. 
Estimated from other sources t o  be in excess of 75 percent. 
NOTE: Because of the importance of subcontracts received by some of the l i s t e d  
firms, the r a t i o  of defense-space orders t o  t o t a l  sales may not always 
be an accurate indicator of the actual  r a t i o  of military-space work t o  
t o t a l  company act ivi ty .  
Source: Company annual reports f o r  sales data; Department of Defense and 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration releases f o r  contract 
data 
* 
rl 
* 
B 
4J 
k 
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When these two groups of companies are  compared, s ignif icant  and mea- 
surable differences are found i n  the i r  basic character is t ics .  Some of these 
differences are not merely ones of degree but are  fundamental and pervasive. 
They range from the nature of product development decisions t o  price deter-  
mination, p ro f i t  ra tes ,  provision of working cap i t a l  and research and develop- 
ment funds, source of plant and equipmnt, nature of the work force, and 
remuneration of top management. 
Financial Characterist ics 
The defense/space contractors tend t o  operate on f a r  smaller p ro f i t  
margins than the commercially-oriented companies. 
f i t s  expressed as a percent of sales were 2.2 percent and 5.2 percent. 
ra l ly ,  this is the comparison most frequently used by defense industry spokes- 
men i n  their public statements. 
f inancial  character is t ics  are  a l so  of in te res t .  
large amounts of manufacturing and research plant and equipment which i s  made 
available t o  them by the defense establishment, defense/space contractors 
report  a f a r  higher rate of capi ta l  turnover (i.e.,  do l la rs  of sales  per 
do l l a r  of company-owned assets) :  
some extent,  the lower p ro f i t  margins and higher turnover r a t e s  f o r  defense 
companies tend t o  of fse t  each other. 
These respective net pro- 
Natu- 
However, other aspects of the comparative 
For example, because of the 
2.5 versus 1.2 fo r  the two samples. To 
However, the return on net worth ( a f t e r -  
t ax  net 
f o r  the 
1962) 
pro f i t s  a s  percent of stockholders investment) i s  higher on balance 
sample of government contractors (13.8 percent versus 9.2 percent i n  
Tbis l a t t e r  comparison may be the most germane f inancial  one. L2 
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Investor Evaluation 
The stock market's evaluation of the defense companies appears t o  be 
l e s s  favorable than tha t  of the general indus t r ia l  corporations. 
i n s t a b i l i t y  of the governmental market and the h i s to r i ca l  v o l a t i l i t y  of the 
The inherent 
fortunes of individual defense contractors are  undoubtedly important influences. 
Also, the lower payout r a t i o  ( the  proportion of net income which i s  actual ly  
disbursed t o  stockholders i n  the form of cash dividends) i s  a related influence. 
I n  1962, t h i s  r a t i o  was only 38 percent f o r  the aerospace companies and 66 
percent f o r  the general indus t r ia l  firms. As a result of these factors,  the 
earnings of the mil i tary firms tend t o  be discounted as shown by the lower 
price/earnings multiple (13 versus 16 1/4). 
Bondholders a l so  tend t o  t r ea t  the securi t ies  of defense-oriented f i r m s  
d i f fe ren t ly  then those of the firms i n  the non-defense sample. Where bonds 
are  outstanding, Moody's, the standard f inancial  ra t ing  service, has categorized 
those of the defense companies as Baa (lower medium grade) or Ba (epeculative) 
and those of the other companies as A (higher medium grade) or  A a  (higher 
Capital Structure 
The re la t ive ly  small degree to  which aerospace companies re ly  on t h e i r  
own physical assets  can be seen by t h e i r  f a r  lower r a t i o  of company-owned 
plant  and equipment t o  sales  (7 percent vs 26 percent) ; indirect ly ,  of course, 
t h i s  indicates the importance of government-supplied capi ta l .  
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A somewhat similar relationship prevails when crude ra t ios  are  prepared of 
cap i t a l  t o  output (taken as  the ratio of depreciated plant and equipment as 
carried on the company books t o  "value added" or  in-house effort). For the 
general industry sample, the capital/output r a t i o  was 1.4, indicating t h a t  
$1.40 of capi ta l  was required, on the average, f o r  each $1.00 of output. 
the aerospace companies, the capi ta l  output r a t i o  was only 0.2. 
For 
In contrast  t o  recent discussions of the tendency f o r  mil i tary contractors 
t o  make a p ro f i t  "on a profit"--on work prlmarily performed by 6ubcontracLo~n 
who themselves earn profits-their  r a t i o  of in-house effort ( v a l w  added t o  
sa les )  i s  s l igh t ly  higher than f o r  the other companies (33 percent compared 
t o  28 percent). 
do more of the t o t a l  work themselves than i s  the case f o r  the sample of 
general indus t r ia l  corporations. 
obtaining some data i n  order t o  verify, o r  contradict, previously untested 
assumptions concerning government-industry relationships. 
That is, defense contractors tend t o  subcontract less and 
This may be another example of the value of 
Research - and Development 
Science and engineering perform a much larger  role f o r  defense/space 
contractors than i n  other branches of business act ivi ty .  Based on data of 
the National Science Foundation for  the industries i n  which the 16 sampled 
firms are located, it is  estimated that expenditures f o r  research and devel- 
opment account fo r  22.5 percent of the sales  of the defense group and 4.3 
percent f o r  the other. 
In good measure, th i s  s i tuat ion resu l t s  from the tremendous amount of 
government research and development contracts which companies serving defense 
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and space markets receive. 
only 40 percent fo r  a l l  other companies. 
devote a somewhat higher proportion of t h e i r  own resources t o  R&D than does 
private industry as  a whole (R&D was 2.6 percent of eales compared t o  1.8 
percent f o r  other companies). 
outlays, a far greater  portion of the typ ica l  defense/space company work 
force consists of s c i en t i s t s  and engineers doing research and development work 
than i s  the case f o r  the average company serving private markets. 
About 90 percent of t h e i r  R&D i s  so financed, and 
However, the defense firms a l so  
A s  a r e su l t  i n  good measure of the heavy R&D 
Manpower 
The high proportion of engineers and other professional employees which 
is  character is t ic  of defense and space work i s  ref lected i n  the greater  
average payroll  cost  per employee ($7,457 versus $5,770). 
fac tor  is a lso  seen i n  the higher dol lar  volume of eales per employee 
($18,040 t o  $13,865). 
plus" nature of much of government procurement. 
However, t h i s  
Of course, the l a t t e r  s t iua t ion  may r e f l ec t  the "cost 
I n  s t r ik ing  contrast ,  the average chief executive of an aerospace com- 
pany receives a s ignif icent ly  lower salary ($148,600) than h i s  counterpart 
i n  other industries ($222,600). 
relationships between the defense/space industry and governmental customer; 
hence, the tendency f o r  the relat ively low pay structure of the Federal 
Government t o  exert a dampening influence on the sa la r ies  of the managements 
doing buelmss primarily with governmental procurement agencies 
This too, may be a consequence of the close 
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Stage i n  the Growth Cycle 
Characterist ically,  the defense-space market has been a major growth area 
of the American economy; the dominant firms i n  the f i e l d  have experienced 
f a r  more rapid increases i n  sales ,  employment, p rof i t s ,  and net worth than 
has been the case f o r  the other large indus t r ia l  corporations generally. 
For example, t o t a l  employment In the sample of aerospace companies 
increased 52 percent over the past  decade and only 11 percent fo r  the general 
indus t r ia l  firms. For sales ,  the respective growth was 170 percent and 61 
percent. 
Primarily, the re la t ive ly  more rapid growth pat tern of the large defense- 
space contractors may result from the equally rapid expansions i n  the require- 
ments of the governmental customers. 
youth of the firms i n  the industry (39 years versus 62 years fo r  the two 
In pert, it may a l so  r e f l ec t  the re la t ive  
samples). 
The tendency f o r  the firms i n  the defense industry t o  c lus te r  i n  several  
areas i n  the western par t  of the United States has had an important e f f ec t  
on the pat tern of regional development i n  the nation during the postwar period; 
most studies of the subject tend t o  conclude tha t  defense production work was 
a major fac tor  i n  the re la t ive  growth ra tes  of various s t a t e s  and metropolitan 
areas i n  the postwar period. Not coincidently, the headquarters and major 
production and research f a c i l i t i e s  of f ive of the s i x  companies i n  the defense 
sample are  located west of the Mississippi River. The headquarter off ices ,  
a t  least, of all s i x  nondefense companies are eas t  of the Mississippi. 
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The Role of the Customer ----
The government represents, for the specialized defense/space suppliers, 
essent ia l ly  a monopsonistic o r  one-customer market. 
Department of Defense procure varying items, but sales  are a l l  made funda- 
mentally t o  the  mil i tary establishment under the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation and similar establishment-wide leg is la t ion  and regulations. The 
A r m e d  Services Procurement Regulation, uni la teral ly ,  establishes numerous 
aspects of the relationship. 
Different agencies of the 
The distinguishing role of the governmental customer a l so  extends t o  the 
in t e rna l  operations of defense/space companies. 
f inanc ia l  reporting systems, industr ia l  engineering and planning (the com- 
pulsory use of PERT/COST systems for  example), l imitat ions on the use of over- 
t i m e ,  purchases from abroad, res t r ic t ions  on charitable contributions, patents, 
and pay rates. 
Department of Defense and NASA result Prom entering in to  contractual relation- 
ships with the government. 
It convers such aspects as  
Most of these requirements on the companies supplying the 
The bulk of these requirements a r i se  e i the r  from 
congressional leg is la t ion  o r  standard mili tary procurement regulations. Ik 
A recent example of the close governmental relationship is afforded by 
a report  of the U.S. General Accounting Office, contending tha t  the leasing 
of computer systems by a defense contractor i s  costing the Federal Government 
more than i f  the Government purchased the equipment and furnished it t o  the 
contractor. 
of computer equipment made ren ta l  the more economical choice. 
argument is i n  terms of management prerogative, the GAO rebut ta l ,  is  significant.  
The company, i n  turn, contended tha t  the high ra te  of obsolescence 
Although neither 
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It countered by saying that  because the Government, In effect, i s  bearing most 
of the cost of rentals  of computer systems used by defense contractors, it 
"should have the r ight  t o  manage. the equipment i n  such a manner a s  t o  f u l f i l l  
the Government's needs a t  l e a s t  cost. 15 
Quite naturally,  the relationship between the defense/space companies 
and the Federal Government has been the cause f o r  considerable and extended 
public concern and questioning. 
as "symbiotic" relationship, a s ta tus  described by Webster 's as "living 
together. . . where the association is  advantageous, o r  often necessary, 
t o  one or  both, and not harmful t o  either." 
Some observers have even referred t o  t h i s  
To be sure, both the industry and the government each bring cer ta in  
strengths t o  the bargaining relationship, and each has some weaknesses. 
example, the Federal Government, par t icular ly  acting through the mil i tary 
establishment, i s  responsible f o r  national survival. 
gives it a high degree of ultimate authority over the en t i re  relationship. 
The mil i tary establishment i t s e l f  possesses the inherent power of the 
For 
This awesome responsibil i ty 
s ingle  buyer over the competititve seller. 
a l ternat ive sellers. In practice, the s e l l e r  -- i.e. the specialized defense 
The buyer can choose amone 
company -- has l i t t l e  alternative,  as witnessed by the singular lack of success 
experienced by defense companies i n  attempting t o  divers i fy  in to  nongovernmental 
markets. 
suppliers, government procurement legis la t ion and regulations uni la te ra l ly  
determine crucial  aspects of governmental-indu€try relationships. 
As a r e su l t  of the locked-in o r  captive nature of many of these 
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Also, the power t o  uni la te ra l ly  mcdify a portion of the relationship,  
through contract cancellations or  other change, is one of the government's 
major inherent strengths and industry's inherent weaknesses. 
parer, through renegotiation, t o  determine, a f t e r  the f ac t ,  the amount of 
p r o f i t  tha t  the individual contractor may r e t a in  i s  a very basic piece of 
authority i n  a private enterprise econoqy based on the p ro f i t  motive. 
The government's 
Defense/space contractors are  not without strengths o r  t h e i r  own. In the 
absence of a well-developed arsenal system, they represent a t  the present time 
a t  l e a s t  the backbone of the nation's s c i en t i f i c  and engineering capabili ty 
and especially the capabili ty from which the government can draw fo r  the 
development and production of weapon and space systems. 
Also, the defense/space industry has considerable discret ion and a b i l i t y  
t o  marshal1 re la t ive ly  large amounts and high quality of the resources devoted 
t o  contracting and other matters c r i t i c a l  t o  i ts  business objectives-scientists, 
engineers, accountants, attorneys, and contract negotiators and administrators. 
Moreover, the company which has performed a large portion of the work on 
a given weapon or space system up t o  a cer ta in  point generally has more 
bargaining parer because the customer knows t ha t  it is l ike ly  t o  do a more 
prof ic ient  and economical job on the remainder of the work than a second 
company s t a r t i ng  afresh. 
In addition, the f ac t  that a given company has devoted a considerable 
amount of e f fo r t  and hence gained some expertise on a given defense or  space 
product provides i t s  representatives with a goodly amount of technical 
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authoritativeness in negotiating contractual changes and in other contract 
administration matters. 
attentAon is focused on those examples where the company representatives 
have pushed (or inadvertently received) too good a bargain. The reverse 
situation is hardly newsworthy. 
On balance, of course, public and legislative 
Overall Impact of the Customer Relationshie --
Viewed in a broad and relatively long-term perspective, the defense/space 
industry is becoming a regulated industry and in such a unique fashion as 
possibly to Justify at times the term "semi-nationalized." 
is not accomplished through an independent commission before which the public 
and the industry can present their cases, as with utilities and other "public 
service" industries. 
ment regulations and other provisions included in government contracts. These 
provisions, which are not customarily found in private business arrangements, 
range from those designed to protect the government as a customer to those 
attempting to encourage a large and growing variety of social and economic 
objectives. 
The regulation 
It is performed, rather, unilaterally through procure - 
The ultimate impact of this form of regulation is yet to be determined. 
The measurable differences in the characteristics of large, specialized 
defense/space companies described above may be indicative of the subtle but 
fundamental changes which can take place within these companies. Moreover, 
the essentially passive reaction of the major defense contractors to the 
cutbacks and other adverse developments in the military market during the 
past year a l so  may be indicative of the qual i ta t ive changes which accompany 
the close continuing relationship between a private enterpr ise  and of govern- 
mental organization. The defense/space companies attend numerous meetings and 
conferences on defense industry "conversion" and related topics and subscribe t o  
background staff studies. 
ment's request f o r  proposals before comi t t ing  any signif icant  amount of funds 
t o  developing new, c iv i l i an  applications of t h e i r  much-vaunted defense/space 
technology and systems management capability. 
f i ca t ion  e f fo r t s  a t  the present time have centered on the government market, 
such a s  coat-plus-fixed-fee contracts with the Office of Economic Opportunity 
t o  operate Job Corps ins ta l la t ions  or small exploratory research contracts 
with the state of California. 
entrepreneurial  e f f o r t s  but of governmental requests for proposals. 
However, in general, they s t i l l  await the govern- 
The maJor nonaerospace divers i -  
'Phese have not been the results of company 
To some degree, the i n i t i a t i v e ,  risk-bearing and similar manifestations 
of enterpr ise  appear t o  have become character is t ics  of the buyer rather than 
the seller i n  the large and rather unique sector of the American economy 
dominated by mili tary and space requirements. This re la t ive ly  unnoticed 
development may be reason f o r  further study by those concerned with the pros- 
pects f o r  future economic growth and technical innovation i n  the United States. 
Foot notes 
Ir An e a r l i e r  version of t h i s  paper appeared i n  the April  1965 issue of 
ChallengeA, The Magazine of Economic Affairs,  published by plew York Uni- 
vers i  ty. 
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